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How LAW FRAMES MORAL INTUITIONS:
THE EXPRESSIVE EFFECT OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
Ben Depoorter* & Stephan Tontrup"
Some contract theorists favor specific performance as the appropriate remedy for
contract breach. According to ethical theorists, specific performance reinforces
the moral obligation that promises should be kept. Some economists argue that
specic performance promotes efficient contract bargaining. This Article
challenges this conventional wisdom, showing that moral evaluations and the
willingness to bargain are themselves strongly affected by whether specific
performance is available as a default remedy or not.
Our insight is based on a novel, original empirical study. This Article presents the
results of an experiment that measures and compares decisions and motivations
involved with the performance, breach, and enforcement of valid legal contracts
that participants signed with each other. We provided one group of participants
with a default remedy of specific performance while another group could prevent
the breach of contract without relying on a legal default. We observed that, when
specific performance was the default remedy, participants decided to sacrifice a
substantial part of their earnings in the experiment in order to obstruct an efficient
breach. Our results indicate that the specific performance default triggered
conflicting moral intuitions about contract breach among contracting parties.
Specific performance made the ethical norm to adhere to the contract more salient
to promisees, while promisors focused on the efficiency of the breach.
Based on these findings, our study challenges fixed, deontological viewpoints on
the immorality of contract breach. In providing a dynamic and empirically
grounded understanding of the ethics of contract breach, our study highlights the
* Professor of Law & Roger E. Traynor Research Chair
(depoorter@uchastings.edu), University of California & Lecturer, Ghent University. We
express our gratitude to Jennifer Arlen, John Crawford, Gerrit De Geest, Christoph Engel,
Yuval Feldman, Oliver Hart, Russell Korobkin, Richard McAdams, Janice Nadler, and
numerous seminar audiences for useful suggestions and comments. We are very grateful to
Francesco Parisi who inspired our research on the effects of legal default contract remedies
in the face of efficient breach.
** Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute of Economics
(tontrup@econ.mpg.de).
674 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 54:673
influence of legal frames on moral intuitions. Our findings also question the
alleged efficiency benefits of specific performance. By inducing deontological
rather than utilitarian intuitions about contract breach, a specific performance
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INTRODUCTION
A long-standing controversy exists regarding whether courts should grant
relief to a disappointed contract promisee in the form of damages or specific
performance.'
1. EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND
INJUNCTIONs 23 (1989) ("[T]he split among legal scholars suggests that the comparative
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Under American law, a damage remedy is the applicable default rule;2
injured contract parties have a right to damages for unexcused breaches by
promisors.3 If damages are adequate to protect the expectation interest of the
injured contract party, courts will not award specific performance or an
injunction.4 Influenced by the economic approach to law, contract scholars reached
a consensus in the early 1980s that the expectation damage remedy is the
appropriate default remedy for a breach of contract. Expectation damages, it was
argued, induce breach only if the cost of Ferformance for the promisor exceeds the
value of performance for the promisee. As a result, performance occurs if and
only if it is efficient.7 By enhancing efficient breach, the expectation damage
remedy prevents excessive performance when the costs of performance outweigh
the value of performance or when the promisor could sell to a higher outside
bidder.8 Other scholars have argued in favor of damage remedies9 because
performance is often more intrusive and harmful to personal freedom than the
damage remedy.' 0 Following Mill's harm principle," performance should be
efficiency of specific performance and money damages is an issue likely to remain
unresolved.").
2. For an overview of equitable relief for breach of contract under the Anglo-
American legal system, see generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 16.1-.6 (4th ed. 1998); ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.4-.7 (3d
ed. 1999); YORIO, supra note 1, at 16.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981).
4. Id. § 359.
5. See Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a
Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REv. 341, 343 (1984) ("The bulk of the
scholarship on efficient remedies has concerned the award of money damages, and a
consensus has been reached on the form of damages that is most likely to promote economic
efficiency.").
6. Id. at 360.
7. John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, I
J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 278 (1972); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage
Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 284-86 (1970).
8. The original statements of this positive relationship between economic
efficiency and breach of contract are: Barton, supra note 7, at 278-79; Birmingham, supra
note 7, at 284-86; Robert L. Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality:
The Geometry of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49, 70 (1969). See, e.g., A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-36 (1983) (discussing how
expectation, reliance, and restitution damages affect breach behavior); Robert Cooter &
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1432, 1463-64
(1985) (providing an economic analysis of contract remedies); Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,
Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 11-19, 29-37 (1985)
(examining the influence on investments in precaution); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466, 470 (1980) (providing an economic model of
the effects of damage measures on breach behavior).
9. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 21 (1981) (proposing that
expectation damages are the "normal and natural measure for contract damages").
10. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE
L.J. 763, 778-79 (1983); J.E. Penner, Voluntary Obligations and the Scope of the Law of
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awarded only when the less intrusive remedial measure of damage compensation
cannot fully redress the harm caused by the violation of the promisee's rights.
Some modern contract theorists, however, favor specific performance as
the more appropriate default remedy.12 Specific performance is the fulfillment of
the performance due in the contract as nearly as practicable, by the party in
breach. 3 Two very distinct strands of scholarship advocate specific performance
as a default remedy. First, ethical theorists favor a specific performance default,
because it aligns with the moral obligation that promises should be kept. Second,
under the consent theory of contracts, for instance, contract rights cannot be
waived unilaterally, unless the contract specifies otherwise.14
Other scholars promote specific performance on economic grounds.'5
From an efficiency perspective, expectation damages may impose unnecessary
costs.16 If contracting parties are rational, they will design an optimal contract and
courts should enforce these terms "rather than give the parties an option
Contract, 2 LEGAL THEORY 325 (1996) (cautioning that specific performance may interfere
with personal freedom).
11. According to Mill's harm principle the actions of individuals should be
restricted only in order to prevent harm to other individuals. JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1869).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981).
13. Id
14. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv.
269, 300 (1986) (arguing that the enforceable nature of a contract's promise derives from a
party's objectively manifested consent to the transfer of his rights); see also Randy E.
Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 179, 180, 195-
201 (1986) ("[M]y thesis will be that the normal rule favoring money damages should be
replaced with one that presumptively favors specific performance unless the parties have
consented to money damages instead."); id. at 195 (putting forward a proposal to place the
burden of arguing against specific performance on the guilty breacher); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory ofEfficient Breach, and the
Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1019 (2005) ("Actual
specific performance should be awarded unless a special moral, policy, or experiential
reason suggests otherwise in a given class of cases, or the promisee can accomplish virtual
specific performance [a commodity that the promisee could not in good faith reject as an
equivalent of the breached performance]."); Daniel Friedmann, The Performance Interest in
Contract Damages, 111 L.Q. REv. 628 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 351,
355-59 (1978) (arguing that specific performance is reserved for disputes involving
valuation problems such as those involving unique goods); Alan Schwartz, The Case for
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 277 (1979) ("[T]he compensation goal implies that
specific performance should be routinely available."); Ulen, supra note 5, at 346 ("[C]ourts
should make specific performance the routine remedy . . . .").
16. For a summary of the literature, see Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies:
General, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & EcoNoMics 117, 122 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Thomas Ulen, Specific Performance, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF LAW AND EcoNoMIcs 481 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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(expectation damages) when they did not bargain for it."' 7 Moreover, expectation
damages may induce socially wasteful breaches of contracts because courts tend to
underestimate the value of performance to promisees.18 By contrast, specific
performance forces a promisor to negotiate with the promisee to seek removal
from his or her contractual duties.' 9 To some economists, specific performance
eliminates much of the ethical concerns about efficient breach. o First, it leaves the
decision of whether a breach can take place with the innocent promisee. Second,
because the promisee knows exactly the value of performance, contracts will be
breached only on terms that meet or exceed the promisee's interest in the original
contract.
In this Article, we claim that contract scholarship overlooks an important
interdependence between contract norms and default remedies. When scholars
argue that the morality of performance or bargaining benefits are a sufficient
justification for specific performance, they ignore how moral evaluations and
bargaining costs are themselves strongly affected by whether specific performance
is available as a default remedy. When expressed as a legal default, the legal right
to insist on performance increases a promisee's sense of entitlement and
resentment against breach.
We posit that specific performance as a legal default may create aversion
against breach even when performance is inefficient. This insight is based on
empirical evidence that we obtained in a novel study for this Article.2 1 We
conducted an incentive-compatible laboratory experiment where participants
signed and performed valid legal contracts that were legally enforceable.22
Participants understood that their decisions would impact their earnings as
stipulated in the contract(s) that they entered into with other participants.
Participants entered into a contract that stipulated a joint task (adjustment
of sliders on a computer screen) and the distribution of gains when the contract
was completed. While one of the participants (the promisee) commenced the
contractual task, his or her counterpart (the promisor) received an outside offer
from a third party that would require the promisor to breach the original contract.
The outside offer presented an opportunity for efficient breach: The gains realized
17. Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades:
Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 880 n.14 (2003) (description of the literature).
While the traditional law and economic position was motivated by ex post efficiency, based
on assumptions about a fully informed judiciary, the more recent position holds ex ante
efficiency out to be more important, while relaxing some of the assumptions about the
accuracy of judicial information.
18. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 271 ("[Tlhe remedy of specific performance
should be as routinely available as the damages remedy.").
19. Id. at 279.
20. Ulen, supra note 5, at 365.
21. We most are grateful to our colleague Francesco Parisi for suggesting and
encouraging us to examine empirically the effect of default remedies on efficient breach.
22. This methodology increases the external validity of the findings. It is
considered more reliable than data obtained in survey questionnaires that always measure
hypothetical rather than actual behavior.
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by the new offer were more than sufficient to fully compensate the expectation
damages of the promisee.
We measured the decisions and motivations of participants regarding the
performance, breach, and enforcement of the legally enforceable contracts entered
into by participants. First, a promisor had to decide whether she would breach or
honor the original contract. Second, a promisee could enforce the original contract
or accept damage compensation. After we observed the behavior of the
participants, we examined their motivations in three additional stages of the
experiment. First, we provided promisors and promisees with an endowment that
could only be used to make a donation to the other contract party. We measured
how the actions of one contracting party influenced the amount the other party
donated. Second, participants could generate additional income by making a wager
on the prediction that the other party would breach or enforce the original contract.
Third, we used questionnaires to ask participants what motivated their behavior in
the experiment.
Our experiment focused on the availability of specific performance as the
default remedy. All promisees in the experiment could prevent the breach of
contract without relying on a legal remedy. A promisee could always instruct that
the outside offer be withdrawn. 23 But one group of partici ants could also prevent
breach by relying on a specific performance default. 4 In other words, all
contracting parties could enforce the contract, but only one Iroup of participants in
the experiment could do so on the basis of the legal remedy. 5
A number of interesting findings emerged. First, we observed that, when
specific performance was the default remedy, promisees demonstrated a strong
preference to enforce the original contract. In fact, participants sacrificed a
substantial part of their earnings in the experiment to obstruct the efficient breach
when specific performance was available.26 By comparison, promisees in the
control group did not object to the efficient breach. The mere availability of
specific performance caused players in the experimental group to insist on the
inefficient performance.
Second, we observed substantially smaller donations whenever promisees
were entitled to specific performance. This suggests that when specific
performance is the applicable default, efficient breaches induce stronger
resentment and even a desire to punish the promisor.
23. In the language of experimental design, this is the control group.
24. This is the experimental group.
25. Although, both groups could enforce the contract; only the basis of
enforcement was different.
26. Because it assured players of a certain payment of E5, all players in the
experiment were strictly better off if they accepted compensation (expectation damages)
from the breaching party. As we explain in more detail below, this assumption holds unless
participants have extreme beliefs about the other party's performance of the task. See infra
text accompanying note 121.
[VOL. 54:673678
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Third, the results show that the specific performance default triggered
conflicting moral intuitions about contract breach among contracting parties.
Specific performance made the ethical norm to adhere to the contract more salient
to promisees, whereas promisors focused on the efficiency of the breach.
Promisees adopted the principled position that promises must be kept and strongly
resented the efficient breach, whereas promisors evaluated the contract on
utilitarian grounds and were much more accepting of efficient breaches of the
contract.
Finally, our data indicated that promisors failed to anticipate how the
specific performance remedy created resentment about the efficient breach among
27promisees.
This Article contests both the economic and deontological argument for
specific performance. First, we advance an empirical understanding of the ethics of
contract breach. Deontological concepts of contract theory often assume that
individuals have a principled aversion against promise breaking.2 8 As an empirical
matter, it appears from our study that the moral obligation to keep one's promise is
context dependent. Individuals seem to have conflicting and contradicting moral
intuitions about contract breach that can be triggered by the legal frame. A default
of specific performance makes the ethical norm to perform the contract more
salient.29 When specific performance was available, breach was evaluated
negatively in light of fairness considerations regarding cooperation and defection.
Without the specific performance default, participants in our study perceived the
breach in a more utilitarian sense, focusing on the gains from trade. The results of
the survey questionnaires confirm that the default remedy triggered the moral
intuitions of promisees and induced a sense of entitlement.
Second, we offer new insights into the relative transaction costs generated
by different remedies for breach of contract. 3 0 Specifically, our findings challenge
the notion that a specific performance default remedy leads to "more mutually
beneficial promises . . . exchanged at a lower cost than under any other contract
27. This effect was observed among promisors who justified the decision to
breach the contract on the basis of the efficiency of the breach and mutual benefits involved.
See infra Part IH.G.
28. Fried, supra note 9, at 14-17; Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract
Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 11, 111
(1981).
29. Specifically, a lawmaker's decision to implement specific performance as the
default remedy might be perceived as a collective commitment to performance as the
relevant norm. For more on this interpretation, see infra Part IV.C.
30. See William Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 299, 300 (1985) ("[T]he optimum structure of the default rules will in the end
turn on differences in the magnitudes of the transaction costs generated by different rules.");
Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947, 952
(1982) ("Whatever 'direction' towards or away from efficiency ... [a damage or specific
performance remedy] has depends entirely upon the relative transaction costs each will
generate.").
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remedy."3 ' Although some economic theorists argue that specific performance is
the favored remedy if no significant bargaining impediments are present, we posit
that the availability of specific performance may negatively affect bargaining
conditions in the following ways: First, instead of viewing contractual rights as a
means to an end, a legal remedy itself may create intrinsic value in carrying out
contractual promises. Second, by boosting the salience of performance, a specific
performance default may cause promisees to insist on performance even when it is
in their material interest to accept the efficient breach. Third, when specific
performance has an expressive effect on the moral intuitions of contract
32promisees, the resulting opposition to breach increases the burden on promisors
when they negotiate to obtain release from inefficient contractual obligations. A
promisor must compensate the promisee not only for the material costs of breach.
The promisor must also obtain forgiveness for violating the statutory entitlement to
performance. If the contract breach is perceived as an insult, material
compensation might not be satisfactory.3 3 In other words, by fueling promisees'
moral aversion to breach, specific performance might lead parties into conflict
rater than negotiation. Overall, because the economic case for specific
performance largely rests on the ability of parties to renegotiate a mutually
beneficial outcome, our findings weaken the efficiency argument in favor of
specific performance.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we provide a brief historical
review of the leading perspectives on optimal contract remedies. Part II describes
the design and implementation of our study. In Part III, we report and discuss our
findings. Part IV derives policy implications for contract theory in particular and
legal regulation more generally.
I. OPTIMAL CONTRACT REMEDIES
One of the central tenets of contract law is the so-called compensation
principle: Contract law has been designed to provide compensation in the case of
breach of contract. 34 Ideally, remedies in contract law put a disappointed promisee
in as good a position as she would have enjoyed if the promisor had performed.3 5
31. Bishop, supra note 30, at 343-44.
32. Following scholarship on the expressive function of the law, by expressing a
collective commitment, laws may cause individuals to internalize the values embodied in
the law or lead them to coordinate their behavior using the law as a benchmark for what is
deemed socially appropriate behavior. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 607-08 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point
Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv. 1649 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2022 (1996).
33. Legal rights are not always "commensurable": individuals are reluctant to
trade the legal entitlement for material compensation. See infra Part IV.D.
34. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1972) ("[R]emedies . . . shall be liberally
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the
other party had fully performed .... ); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932).
35. In addition to expectation damages, contract law also recognizes the
following potential interests of a contract promisee: the "reliance interest" (interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as
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Two different contract remedies potentially achieve this purpose: a damage
payment imposed upon the breaching party (legal relief) or a court order to deliver
the promised performance (equitable relief).
A long-standing controversy exists regarding whether it is preferable for
courts to grant relief in the form of damages or specific performance.36 This
question has fascinated scholars, commentators, and courts for several decades, but
it also resonates in a global comparative law perspective. Interestingly, the legal
rules on remedies for breach of contract differ significantly not only between
Anglo-American and civil law systems but also across different countries in both
systems.37 For instance, under Anglo-American law, specific performance is an
exceptional remedy,38 but under German law it is the general remedy for a breach
of contract.39
promisee would have been in had the contract not been made) and the "restitution interest"
(interest in having restored any benefit that promisee has conferred on the other party).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(b)-(c) (1981). The economic literature has
likewise concluded that specific performance is efficient in terms of providing the right
incentives with regard to reliance, restitution, and the formation of efficient contracts. See
Ulen, supra note 5, at 481.
36. The discussion takes us back to the turn of the previous century when Oliver
Wendell Holmes claimed that the common law should move away from a moral
interpretation of contract:
The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it, and nothing else. If you commit
a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a
contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised
event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of
looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897); see also
Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1903) (one of Holmes's
first Supreme Court opinions). But see Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56
EMORY L.J. 439 (2006) [hereinafter Shavell, Breach Immoral?]; Steven Shavell, Why
Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 1569, 1579-80 (2009) [hereinafter Shavell, Breach Not Immoral].
37. For information on specific performance across different countries in Europe
and in the rest of the world, see generally Guenter H. Treitel, Remedies for Breach of
Contract (Courses of Action Open to a Party Aggrieved), in 7 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW § 16-7 to -39 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1976);
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KoTz, INTRODUCTION To COMPARATIVE LAW 472-83 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d rev. ed. 1998).
38. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, § 16.1 ("The primary relief that the
Anglo-American legal systems offer is substitutionary relief, normally damages. . . .
Specific performance is an extraordinary remedy .... ).
39. ZWEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 37, at 472-74. More accurately, substitute
performance is the remedy for non-unique goods. This applies even to obligations to deliver
property, notwithstanding the fact that specific performance is considered to be the normal
remedy. Id at 472. The procedure described in § 883-6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the
bailiff taking the chattel from the debtor) is only applicable if no positive action of the
promisor is required (such as ordering or specifying the goods).
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In this Part, we briefly review the basic framework of contract law default
remedies before documenting the shift in focus from expectation damages to
specific performance in contract law scholarship.
A. Contract Remedy Defaults
Under American law, an injured contract party has "a right to damages
for any breach by a party against whom the contract is enforceable unless the claim
for damages has been suspended or discharged."40 A damage remedy is the
applicable default.41 If damages can be considered adequate to protect the
expectation interest of the injured contract party, courts will not award specific
42performance or an injunction.
Parties can select specific performance as the preferred remedy in their
contract, but specific performance is never a right of contracting parties;4 rather, it
is an equitable remedy applied at the discretion of the court.44 Courts generally
apply the inadequacy-of-damages test before awarding specific performance.
According to this test, equitable relief is denied if a compensatory award provides
adequate protection of the injured party. Expectation damages are inadequate, for
instance, when it would be difficult to determine the value of the contract
performance, where a suitable substitute cannot be purchased, or where the party
in breach lacks adequate financial resources. Courts generally grant specific
performance as a remedy in cases that involve sales of "unique goods" 45 or cases
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 346 (1981).
41. For an overview of equitable relief for breach of contract under the Anglo-
American legal system, see generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 2, at §§ 16.1-6;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at § 12.4-.7.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 (1981).
43. Yoluo, supra note 1, at § 19.2 (noting that "a clause in a contract providing
for specific performance ... does not by itself bind a court to grant the agreed remedy," and
discussing reasons why a court might not choose to enforce such a provision); see
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at § 12.6.
44. "Specific performance of a contract duty will be granted in the discretion of
the court against a party who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of the
duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981). "[S]uch a remedy may be
considered in exercising discretion under the rule stated in § 357." Id. at § 359(3) ("[I]t must
be remembered that specific performance is not a matter of right, even when the plaintiff's
evidence establishes a contract valid at law and sufficient for the recovery of damages.
Ordering specific enforcement of a contract is a matter within the sound judicial discretion
of the court. .. . [T]he plaintiff was required to show the good faith and equities of its own
position, and the trial chancellor, in weighing the equities, was entitled to consider whether
a decree of specific performance would work an unconscionable advantage to the plaintiff
or would result in injustice."); Pub. Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642, 647
(Mo. App. 1966); accord, Green, Inc. v. Smith, 317 N.E.2d 227, 233 (1974) (cited in
Schwartz, supra note 15, at 272).
45. U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1999) ("Specific performance may be decreed where the
goods are unique or in other proper circumstances."). See, e.g., Triple-A Baseball Club
Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that a contract for
sale of minor league baseball franchise was "unique in character and cannot be duplicated")
(cited in FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, at 175).
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in which damages are difficult to assess.46 Instead of ordering specific
performance, a court may issue an injunction ordering a party to refrain from
certain acts. A classic example is Lumley v. Wagner.47 Upon breach of a contract
that granted exclusive performance rights to a theater company, an opera singer
was issued an injunction restricting her from performing before a live audience
during the original contract period. However, even if a disappointed promisee is
able to show that there is no adequate remedy at law, specific performance is not a
foregone conclusion. Promisors can raise a number of defenses against specific
performance that are not available against a damages award.48
By contrast, many civil law countries take the opposite approach with
regard to contract default remedies. The standard formulation in civil law contract
codes is that specific performance is the routine applicable remedy. 49
Compensatory damages are reserved for situations where performance is
impossible due to exigent circumstances. German law is the clearest example.so
Specific performance is the general remedy for breach of contract in Germany."
Accordingly, depending on whether a contract involves moveable or immovable
property, a court can order the seizure of the object or ejection of the seller from
the subject land.52
While black-letter law suggests a strong contrast between common law
and civil law systems, in practice, courts in both systems deviate from the default
remedy whenever it is deemed appropriate. American courts will forsake
expectation damages when performance is relatively straightforward or
particularly valuable to a disappointed promisee. Similarly, courts in civil law
countries regularly apply the non-default damage remedy. 3 Steven Shavell has
explained these patterns by distinguishing contracts to produce services or goods
46. Triple-A Baseball, 832 F.2d at 224.
47. (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Q.B.).
48. These defenses include inadequacy of consideration, lack of security for the
promisee's performance, the promisor's unilateral mistake, and the difficulty a court would
have in supervising a specific performance decree. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
§ 12.6-.7.
49. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 37, at 472-74.
50. Id.
51. Id. Specific performance is applied even to contracts involving personal
services. Pragmatically, of course, enforcement is often impossible in such instances.
52. Id. at 473-74.
53. See Janwillem Oosterhuis, Industrialization and Specific Performance in the
German Territories During the 19th Century, in THE RIGHT TO SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 97 (J. Hallebeek & J.H. Dondorp eds., 2010) (explaining
how nineteenth-century Germany merchants prefered to switch to other sellers rather than
wait for a court to impose specific performance on the original promisor); Henrik Dan
Lando & Caspar Rose, On the Enforcement ofSpecific Performance in Civil Law Countries,
24 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 473, 476 (2004) (showing that promisees tend to prefer cover
transactions above specific performance whenever they have the choice in civil law
countries).
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and contracts to deliver goods.54 Offering a "production cost" explanation, Shavell
argues that contracting parties generally prefer that courts apply a damage remedy
to contracts for the production of things or for providing services.55 Because the
costs of performing production or service agreements can be much higher than
anticipated, a strict application of a specific performance remedy imposes serious
risk on a seller; pricing those risks would drive up the costs to the buyer as well
because the seller would seek a higher price to insure against the risk and costs of
non-enforcement.56 By contrast, specific performance is a more effective remedy
for contracts involving the conveyance of property. Because the goods already
exist, such contracts generally do not impose production cost uncertainties of
similar magnitude.5 7
Next, we review the broader contract law literature on default remedies.
As we describe below, a broad range of literature discusses the relative advantages
and disadvantages of various default remedies for contract breach. We first review
the evolving economic perspective, as well as non-utilitarian, deontological
viewpoints on contract breach.
B. Theoretical Perspectives on Contract Breach Remedies
Influenced by the economic approach to law, modern contract scholarship
reached a consensus in the early 1980s that damages are the appropriate default
58
remedy for broken promises.
At least two key arguments influenced this perspective. First, scholars in
law and economics took a favorable position toward expectation damages, arguing
that this remedy enabled promisees to breach a contract when it was economically
efficient to do so. Accordingly, because the expectation damage remedy forces the
promisor to compensate the promisee for the total expected value of the contract,
the contract will be breached only if the cost of performance to the promisor
exceeds the value of performance to the promisee. 59 As a result, promisors breach
if and only if it is socially beneficial-that is, when the breaching promisor stands
to gain more from the breach than the promisee stands to lose. Meanwhile, the
expectation damage remedy places disappointed promisees in as good a position as
they would have enjoyed if the promisor had performed. Thus, the breach is
acceptable to all parties. At the same time, by enhancing efficient breach,
expectation damages prevent excessive performance-namely, when the costs of
performance outweigh the value of performance or when the promisor could sell to
54. Steven Shavell, Specific Performance Versus Damages for Breach of
Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 TEx. L. REV. 831, 831-57 (2006).
55. Id. at 841-46.
56. Id. at 843-46.
57. Id. at 833-34.
58. See Ulen, supra note 5, at 343 ("The bulk of the scholarship on efficient
remedies has concerned the award of money damages, and a consensus has been reached on
the form of damages that is most likely to promote economic efficiency.").
59. Id. at 360.
60. Barton, supra note 7, at 282; see also Birmingham, supra note 7, at 284.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
a higher outside bidder.6 ' By contrast, excessive performance would be harder to
avoid under a default remedy of specific performance. Because an unbridled right
to specific performance provides a promisee with a veto option to stop the
breach,62 it confers considerable power over a promisor that faces high compliance
costs.6 3 If specific performance was routinely available, promisors who wanted to
breach would often be compelled to "bribe" promisees to release them from their
obligations.64 Negotiations under specific performance might be more complex
and strategic than when breaching promisors merely face the costs of
65
compensating promisees for their damages. As a result, specific performance can
generate higher transaction costs or, if negotiations fail, it might lead to inefficient
outcomes. Second, performance is likely to be unsatisfactory to a promisee if it is
complex and costly to evaluate. A reluctant promisor is more likely to deliver a
defective performance when a court coerces the performance.6 6 Because "the
defectiveness of complex performances is sometimes difficult to establish in
court,"6 7 specific performance might not always be satisfactory to a disappointed
promisee.
By contrast, some contract scholars favor s Recific performance as the
appropriate standard remedy for contract breach. 8 The case for specific
61. See supra note 8.
62. Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1405-08 (1982) (pointing out that this might conflict with the
interests of courts to attain fair and balanced outcomes).
63. RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-89 (2d ed. 1977)
(defending current law on efficiency grounds); Kronman, supra note 15, at 360-69 (same);
E. Allan Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 249-51 (1979).
64. Schwartz expects however that promisees would seldom abuse this power
because promisees have more to gain from accepting a damage award when such award
"would be even approximately compensatory." Schwartz, supra note 15, at 278.
65. On "post-breach" negotiation cost savings of a damages remedy, see
POSNER, supra note 62, at 88-89. Other commentators have made similar arguments. See
Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 351, 360 n.32; Yorio, supra note 62, at 1365.
66. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 277.
67. Id Additionally, Schwartz argues that timing aspects of performance may
make a damage remedy more appealing to a promisee:
Further, when the promisor's performance must be rendered over time,
as in construction or requirements contracts, it is costly for the promisee
to monitor a reluctant promisor's conduct. If the damage remedy is
compensatory, the promisee would prefer it to incurring these
monitoring costs. Finally, given the time necessary to resolve lawsuits,
promisees would commonly prefer to make substitute transactions
promptly and sue later for damages rather than hold their affairs in
suspension while awaiting equitable relief.
Id.
68. See, e.g., supra note 15. For an empirical test of the efficiency of specific
performance, see Yair Listokin, The Empirical Case for Specific Performance: Evidence
from the IBP-Tyson Litigation, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 469 (2005) (observing positive
stock market response to unusual specific performance award in merger conflict). More
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performance rests on two very distinct normative grounds: the utilitarian
perspective of the economic analysis of the law and deontological viewpoints that
condemn contract breach as per se immoral.
The economic argument for specific performance as the routine remedy
for breach of contract is based on three principal assumptions. First, expectation
damages are regarded as unnecessary and potentially costly. If contracting parties
are rational, it is argued, they will design an optimal contract, and courts should
enforce their terms "rather than give the parties an option (expectation damages)
when they did not bargain for it."69 By contrast, specific performance forces a
promisor to negotiate with the promisee to be absolved from his or her contractual
duties.70 Because promisees will only accept measures of compensation that meet
or exceed the expected value of the original contract, specific performance
eliminates much of the concern regarding both the perceived immorality of
efficient breach and the occurrence of inefficient breaches.7 1
Second, by inducing private bargaining, specific performance removes
the burden on courts to assess the accuracy of damage claims. Promisees generally
possess better information than courts as to the costs that a breach imposes on
them, the adequacy of damages, and the difficulties of coercing performance. Also,
because promisees generally know more about their promisors than courts do, they
are in a better position to decide whether the default remedy of specific
performance will induce a satisfactory performance or whether they would prefer
compensation for their damages.
Third, the case for specific performance is strengthened if it is reasonable
to assume that judicial damage awards systematically under-compensate
recent criticism on the protection of contract rights on the basis of liability rules include:
Richard R. W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE L.J. 568, 573-74
(2006); Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1017; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest
in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REv. 559, 581-88 (2006); Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-13 (1989). One notable exception is Daniel
Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the
Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REv. 1939, 1948-61 (2011) (arguing that expectation
remedies imply "transfer or trade" understanding among contracting parties).
69. Posner, supra note 17, at 880 n. 14 (description of the literature).
70. Kronman, supra note 15, at 366-67.
71. Note that this conclusion follows from the conventional assumption that
specific performance (as a property rule) promotes bargaining. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972). Recent literature suggests that the case for
property rules is not so one-sided as once assumed. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic
Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J.
1027, 1032 (1995) (suggesting that liability rules have an information forcing effect that
improves bargaining outcomes in certain situations). But see Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 Yale
L.J. 221 (1995) (providing a critical review of the various arguments offered by Ayres and
Talley).
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promisees. 72 Some costs of contract breach, such as emotional distress for instance,
are not recoverable under law. Other costs are recoverable in theory only. Many
incidental costs are hard to monetize and claim. For instance, although a
disappointed promisee is entitled to recover the costs incurred in finding a
substitute and negotiating a new deal, it is hard to put a dollar amount on such
costs. As a result of evidentiary problems, disappointed promisees may be
prevented from recovering the exact amount that they stood to gain from the
contract. 74 Consequently, promisors may sometimes breach when their gains from
breach exceed the damages a court will assess, even though this is less than the full
cost the breach imposes on the promisees. If this happens, damages induce
inefficient breaches that make promisors better off but promisees worse off 75
Anthony Kronman has argued that specific performance is especially
appealing when a breached contract concerns "unique goods."7 6 When the subject
of a contract is the delivery of a unique work, such as artwork, courts face serious
information costs. It might be next to impossible to verify the accuracy of a
promisee's claim as to the personal value in obtaining the work. In these cases, a
damage remedy is likely inaccurate. If the court grants the market price, this might
be below the actual value to the promisee; whereas, if the court bestows the
(claimed) personal value to the promisee, this likely overestimates the actual value,
especially because this would create an incentive for the promisee to exaggerate
her personal valuation. In such instances, requiring performance is beneficial
because it is fully compensatory and relatively costless-that is, requiring that the
72. Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 989-97 (detailing ways in which damages
under-compensate). "The compensation goal implies that specific performance should be
routinely available. This is because damage awards actually under-compensate in more
cases than is commonly supposed." Schwartz, supra note 15, at 277 (arguing also that
demands for specific performance are an indication that damages would under-compensate
because otherwise most promisees would find other opportunities to do it).
73. Schwartz, supra note 15, at 278.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Kronman, supra note 15, at 355-65. Kronman classifies as "unique" those
objects for which courts would have great difficulty identifying substitutes. Id at 365.
Because of the "volume, refinement, and reliability of the available information about
substitutes for the subject matter of the breached contract." Id. at 362. More recently, Paul
Mahoney has applied option theory to explain the usefulness of specific performance as
applied to unique goods. Paul G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995). Mahoney argues that damage remedies be designed in a manner
analogous to options under which a buyer may purchase entitlement to performance. Id. at
139. In this analogy, the option expires at the date when the deadline for performance was
set in the contract. Id. at 143. The value of the option is the price of the damage award. Id.
With regard to unique goods (such as a valuable painting), risk-averse parties might choose
to avoid speculation or being subject to price fluctuations. Id. at 154-55. Specific
performance is a more adequate remedy in that case: By removing the option of the seller to
pay damages, the contract effectively becomes a hedged commodity. Id
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original artwork be delivered to the promisee avoids the valuation and information
cost issues entirely.77
As this overview illustrates, the economic analysis of contract remedies
focuses on transaction and information cost arguments. A damage remedy removes
the need for bargaining but may induce opportunistic breach. Specific performance
removes the fear of under-compensation but forces the breaching party into
negotiations. In this framework, the optimal remedy depends on a trade-off
between information costs (which favors specific performance) and transaction
costs (which favors damage compensation).
The traditional economic approach to contract law stands in contrast to
other perspectives on contract breach that build on non-utilitarian, deontological
considerations about the fairness, ethics, and social norms involved with
contractual duties.79 These positions question the permissibility of contract breach
on a principled basis. Some commentators emphasize the moral duty of a
contractual promise, arguing that legal systems should discourage breach unless
specific mitigating circumstances exist.8
When economic and deontological scholars favor specific performance as
a default, they arrive at this conclusion on the basis of very different premises.
Law and economics scholars encourage efficient breach. If private bargaining is
assumed to proceed smoothly, a specific performance remedy will not prevent
efficient breaches; it simply ensures that the promisee (rather than a court) gets the
final say on the appropriate compensation before the promisor is absolved from his
or her contractual duties.81 Deontological proponents of specific performance
77. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory ofDefault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93-94 (1989) (seminal contribution on
default rules).
78. The textbook case, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., serves as the
classic illustration of the various factors in consideration. 382 P.2d. 109 (Okla. 1962). When
Willie and Lucille Peevyhouse entered into a lease agreement with the Garland Coal &
Mining Company, they inserted a clause in the lease under which Garland promised to
engage in restoration and remediation work on the property at the end of the lease. Id at
111. When the lease expired, the Garland Coal & Mining Company refused to perform the
contractually provided restoration work on the grounds. Id The court excused the mine
company from the work because the cost of performance ($29,000) was disproportionate to
the resulting increase in market value of the land ($300). Id at 112. On the one hand, the
damage award makes sense if we are concerned about a potentially unbalanced outcome: A
specific performance remedy provides the Peevyhouses with a veto right against a damage
payment, such that a potentially wasteful performance might occur if no agreement is
reached. See id. On the other hand, if we acknowledge the issue of information costs
involved in accessing the subjective value that performance has for the contracting parties,
it is likely that the $300 award under-compensates: The Peevyhouse family likely valued
restoration more than what was reflected in the market appreciation of the land. See id
79. See infra Part IV.A.
80. Id.
81. Additionally, if a promisor's expected benefit from a breach of contract were
sufficient to fully indemnify the disappointed promisee, it would be socially wasteful to
adhere to the contract. Ulen, supra note 15. But see Friedmann, supra note 68, at 5-8
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argue that voluntary renegotiations are the only morally acceptable way to suspend
a contractual obligation.82
This Article challenges both the economic and deontological argument
for specific performance. First, we argue that, by impacting the moral acceptability
of efficient breach, the applicable remedy affects the likelihood that private
bargaining will lead to the socially optimal outcome. When provided as a default
remedy, the legal right of specific performance forms the moral intuitions of
contract promisees. The resulting sense of entitlement may create resentment
against compensation for contract breach, even when performance would be
inefficient. The overlooked interdependency between contract norms and default
remedies complicates the utilitarian question of whether promisees should be
awarded relief in the form of damages or specific performance. While most
economic theorists favor specific performance if no significant bargaining
impediments are present, we posit that the availability of specific performance may
itself negatively affect bargaining conditions. If a specific performance as a default
remedy provokes moral aversion against breach, promisors face a steeper
challenge when negotiating to obtain release from inefficient contractual
obligations. They must compensate the promisee not only for the material losses,
but they must also obtain forgiveness for violating the statutory entitlement to
performance. Contract breach might be perceived as an insult that cannot as easily
be absolved by material compensation." Because the economic case for specific
performance largely rests on the ability of parties to renegotiate a mutually
beneficial outcome, our findings weaken the efficiency argument in favor of
specific performance.
Second, the endogenous nature of moral intuitions suggests that
individuals are not principally opposed to contract breach. Rather, the default
remedy influences the moral acceptability of contract breach. As an empirical
matter, it appears that the ethical norm of promise keeping is highly context-
dependent.84 Individuals seem to have a set of conflicting and contradicting moral
intuitions that can be triggered by the legal frame.
(challenging the viewpoint that a legal system merely puts a "price" on unlawful behavior
that can be "bought" be the offender).
82. Economists disagree, stating that contract breaches are not immoral when
one recognizes that contracts are necessarily incomplete. When a party breaches a contract
because of an unforeseen contingency, nothing predetermines who should bear the
contractual responsibility. Shavell, Breach Immoral?, supra note 36, at 439; see also
Shavell, Breach Not Immoral, supra note 36 at 1579-80.
83. Legal rights are not always "commensurable": individuals are reluctant to
trade the legal entitlement for material compensation. See infra Part IV.D.
84. In a recent article, Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman use survey
questionnaires to document the role of moral commitments and social norms of individuals.
See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?,
100 GEo. L.J. 5, 32 (2011) (showing that the moral commitment to perform is less strong for
standard form or contracts containing ambiguous terms).
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In the next Part, we present our study and report the results in greater
detail. We closely examine the interaction between contract remedies, moral
attitudes toward efficient breach, and the actual behavior of contracting parties.
II. CONTRACT BREACH, REMEDIES, AND ENTITLEMENT:
AN EXPERIMENT
A. Introduction
This Part describes our empirical study. We provided participants with an
opportunity to sign a legally valid contract. The contract described a joint task.
Once the initial contract was signed, one of the contracting parties (the promisor)
received an offer to enter into a different, more lucrative contract with a third
party. The promisor could only perform one contract, so she had to decide between
performing on the already-signed contract and breaching this commitment by
signing a new contract with the third party.
If a promisor decided to breach the contract, the original promisee had to
decide whether she wanted to enforce the original contract or accept compensatory
damages. Promisees could enforce the original contract by demanding that the
outside offer be withdrawn. In one of our two experimental groups, some
promisees could also enforce the contract by relying on a default remedy of
specific performance. We analyzed how the availability of specific performance
influenced the enforcement decisions and the moral judgments of the contracting
parties.
B. Methodology and Procedures
Experimental methodologies have strengths and weaknesses. Although
laboratory experiments enable researchers to control outside influences and
analyze causal relationships carefully, the artificial setting of such studies makes
them susceptible to the criticism that the results are not always meaningful for
understanding real-world phenomena. For instance, in experimental studies
involving contracts, the decisions and consequences are usually presented in
hypothetical terms. Participants are aware that they do not sign a real contract.
Additionally, the reliability and external validity of these studies are reduced
further because the decisions impose no practical monetary consequences for
participants. Such hypothetical approaches reduce the reliability and external
validity of the results.
In our study we increased the realism and external validity of the results
by using four measures. First, we made the experiment more realistic by
85. David De Cremer & Daan van Knippenberg, How Do Leaders Promote
Cooperation? The Effects of Charisma and Procedural Fairness, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
858, 860 (2002).
86. See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and
Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPiRiCAL LEG. STUD. 405 (2009) (survey-
based experimental evidence).
20121 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 691
introducing monetary incentives. Participants understood that their decisions
would impact their earnings as stipulated in the contract(s) that they entered into
with other participants.
Second, we introduced an important and novel methodological
innovation. Participants were informed that they were signing real contracts with
each other on the basis of the German Civil Law code, sections 301, 241 BGB. 8
Additionally, participants were reminded that they were legally bound by the
contracts, which were enforceable in public courts. 89 This aspect of the study made
the decisions of participants more reflective of the actual consequences that would
occur in real-life interaction.90 More generally, this approach enabled us to
combine the virtue of realism from field studies with the advantage of the strictly
controlled environments found in laboratory studies.9 1
Participants were aware, of course, that the anonymity of the laboratory
setting would make enforcement impossible for them. In order to enforce the
contract in a court of law, participants would need to obtain the identity of their
contractual partner. Participants realized that their contracting partner was present,
but they were unaware of their names and could not identify them. Additionally, a
double-blind procedure ensured that the researcher was not able to tell whether
participants were contractual partners in the experiment.
Third, we required participants to perform a real task in the laboratory to
fulfill their contractual duties. Although prior studies treat performance as a
hypothetical issue, a breach of contract is more realistic to participants if
performance is an actual possibility. Additionally, the fact that both parties were
87. Depending on their decisions during the experiment, participants stood to
gain an average of I12.
88. Section 241 (Duties arising from an obligation) of the German Civil Code
(BGB) reads:
(1) By virtue of an obligation an obligee is entitled to claim performance
from the obligor. The performance may also consist in forbearance;
(2) An obligation may also, depending on its contents, oblige each party
to take account of the rights, legal interests and other interests of the
other party.
BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIvIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETBLATT
[BGBL.] I, § 241.We applied the German Civil Code because the experiment was conducted
in Germany. As discussed in Part I, specific performance is the default rule in Germany. In
the experiment we made the German legal default more salient in the experimental
condition by specifiying to promisees that they can rely on the specific performance
remedy.
89. Individuals in experiments are more likely to comply with actual, legally
valid contracts. See Stephan Tontrup et al., The Expressive Function of Contracts (2010)
(unpublished Max-Planck working paper series) (on file with author).
90. Although we cannot replicate the full reality of the outside world inside the
laboratory context, we did bring into the laboratory the most important factor under
examination: the contract. Exit interviews with participants confirmed that they understood
that they had closed real contracts instead of hypothetical contracts.
91. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, Field Experiments in Economics: The Past,
the Present, and the Future, 53 EUR. EcoN. REv. 1 (2009).
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involved with the contract performance further enhanced the degree of realism.
This aspect of the design resembles more closely the mutual duties typically shared
by contracting parties.
Finally, we ensured that participants in the experiment were not merely
students. By including workers or employees from the public and the private
sectors, our observations are based on a sample that includes a broad segment of
the general public.
C. Contract Formation
We assigned participants to different roles: A (promisor), B (promisee),
and C (outside bidder). The participants were presented with the option of signing
a binding contract to perform an individual task with a shared objective that results
in a joint monetary payoff for both contracting partners.92 The goal of the task was
to position a slider on a computer screen at the middle point of a scale (indicated at
point 50 on a scale of 0 and 100).93 A total of 48 sliders appeared on the screen.
While each slider was initially positioned at 0, a click of the mouse stopped the
slider at any integer location between 0 and 100. The final position of the slider
was displayed only when participants stopped its movement. The participant could
readjust the slider an unlimited number of times. The computer program displayed
the number of sliders that were positioned correctly. To complete the task
successfully, A and B together had to position 120 sliders in total.94 The
participants had ten minutes to complete the task.
Upon completion of the task, A and B could sell their joint work to the
experimenter for a total amount of E10. The F10 was split on the basis of the terms
stipulated in a contract entered into between participants A and B prior to the
execution of the task.95 We provided participants with the basic content of each of
the available contracts, allowing the contracting parties to choose between a few
different terms. 96 The participants selected from one of the following contract
conditions:
92. In the language of experimental studies, parties become "players of a game"
involving "real effort" tasks.
93. On the methodology applied for this task, see David Gill & Victoria L.
Prowse, A Novel Computerized Real Effort Task Based on Sliders (Institute for the Study of
Labor, IZADiscussioN PAPER 5801, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1732324.
94. The task is successfully completed regardless of the distribution of the
correctly positioned sliders. Any combination that totals 120 is sufficient to successfully
complete the task.
95. If one party refused to participate, they both earned nothing from the
contract, but the breaching party had to give the other compensation. Compensation
consisted of the amount that the other party would have earned if the contract had been
fulfilled. The actual amount again depended on what payment scheme the parties stipulated
in the contract they agreed upon.
96. We are aware that this design is more complicated than exogenously
imposing all terms. Still, by offering a few standard forms to choose from, participants were
alerted to the fact that they were concluding a legally valid contract. We believe that this
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Contract 1-Merit-Based Contract: This contract divided the payoff
exclusively on the basis of the individual performance of the contracting parties. If
the contracting parties successfully completed the task by adjusting the sliders at
least 120 times, the total pay off of E10 was distributed between the parties
depending on the proportion of sliders that each player adjusted individually. For
example, if A adjusted 70 sliders while B adjusted 60 sliders, A would earn C5.40
and B would earn C4.60.
Contract 2-Equal Division Contract: This contract split the earnings
independently of the individual contribution to the total amount of successfully
positioned sliders. Each party thus earned C5 as soon as the parties managed to
adjust 120 sliders correctly overall.
Contract 3-Graduated Division Contract: Like Contract 2, this contract
divided the earnings evenly unless the faster party correctly adjusted at least 50%
more sliders than the slower party. If, for example, A adjusted 100 sliders, while B
only adjusted 30, the contracting parties were paid in proportion to the results.
The different contracts were selected on the basis of the following
procedure: One participant offered the terms of contract (1, 2, or 3) and the other
participant agreed or declined. A valid contract required the agreement of both
parties. If B rejected A's contract offer, the initiative to offer terms switched to B.
If the parties failed to reach an agreement on the selection of a contract, the
experiment ended for this pair of participants. Each participant received a flat fee
of C4 for attending the expiriment. Additional earnings depended on the decisions
of participants in the experiment.
D. Outside Offer: Efficient Breach Opportunity
While B completed the task of positioning the sliders, A received an
attractive outside offer (option) from a third participant (C). Participant C offered
to pay Participant A £15 to engage in the joint task involving the adjustment of 80
sliders.9 7 If A accepted the contract offer of C, A would not be able to perform the
contract with B. As a result of breaching the contract with B, A would relinquish
the expected payoff she would have received under the terms of her contract with
B.
If A breached the contract, B received £5 as compensation for the breach
(as opposed to the C5 he could have earned from the contract if the task was
completed correctly). A could either accept or reject the third-party offer. Once A
accepted the offer from C, B was informed about the intended breach of the
contract by A and that B would be compensated with C5 in case of breach.
The third party, C, was able to make offers to one player of each pair of
contractual partners, either A or B. Participant C earned £1 for each successfully
executed and performed contract with A players: Although C owed e15 to A as a
increase of external validity and realism outweighs the enlarged complexity of the
experiment.
97. To complete the original contract between A and B, subjects had to adjust a
total of 120 sliders. The outside offer from C requires that only 80 sliders be adjusted.
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result of the contract, C obtained C16 by selling the outcome of the performances
to the experimenter.
If a contract was not completed, C neither earned money, nor had to pay
C15. In cases where the contract was enforced using specific performance, or if C
was asked to withdraw her offer, the experimenter did not propose to buy the
performance outcome. Instead, the offer was withdrawn automatically.
E. Enforcement by the Contract Promisee: The Experimental Manipulation
We divided promisees (participants in the role of B) into two groups. In
the specific performance experimental group, B could exercise the specific
performance remedy, forcing A to carry out the contractual obligations. Although
this was the applicable default rule, 99 it was explicitly clarified in the contract that
a default of specific performance applied to the contract. This provided B with
three options (action choices). Option I allowed A to breach the contract and to
receive damage compensation for the full expectation value of the contract. Option
2 relied on specific performance to enforce the original contract with A. Option 3
prevented the breach by instructing the third party, C, to withdraw the outside
offer.
In the control group, the specific performance remedy was not available
to B. However, as was the case in the specific performance experimental group, B
was able to prevent the breach (see Option 3 above) by instructing the third party
(C) to withdraw the offer. Again, B was informed that the third party would
withdraw the offer if requested to do so. Alternatively, B could allow the breach
(Option 1 above).
Note that the financial benefits of the informal enforcement (Option 3)
and legal enforcement (Option 2) options are identical: The third-party offer would
be withdrawn automatically in both instances. Only the nature of the remedy was
different: In the experimental group, B had a legal right to prevent breach on top of
having the power to prevent the breach without using the legal remedy; in the
control group, B had no legal right to insist on performance but could still demand
that C withdraw the outside offer. With this design, we sought to isolate the effect
the right of specific performance had on participants' decision-making. We asked
participants in both groups whether they believed that their partner would enforce
the contract or not. We asked Player A to make a wager on their prediction.
Participants could select any amount, but had to bet at least one cent. If the
estimation was correct, the player received twice the wagered amount. If the
estimation proved incorrect, the wagered amount would be lost. Participants
retained the remainder of the 100 cents that they did not wager. Bets should reflect
the confidence of a participant's prediction.
98. We implemented two conditions; both groups received different treatments.
99. Under German law, specific performance follows from section 241 and is the
legal default unless parties explicitly rule it out. BURGELICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL
CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 42, as amended, § 241 (Ger.).
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F. Donations Round
Once the players made their decisions in the contract stage of the
experiment, we introduced participants to a surprise second section of the
experiment.100 Both parties received an endowment of 100 cents, and they were
asked to decide how much they wanted to donate to the other party. Participants
were informed that this was a "costless" donation-regardless of the selected
amount, the participants would not retain the remaining amount of money.
Therefore, donations below 100 cents could be regarded as a form of punishment.
Employing the strategy method, 01 we asked the A participants how much they
would transfer if their contractual partner 1 02 had enforced the contract or allowed
the breach. Similarly, we asked B participants to specify a transfer amount
assuming that A had declined the outside offer or breached the contract.
This stage of the experiment examined how much each participant
disapproved of the actions of their contract partner. If promisees strongly resented
the breach, they might not make any donations or might transfer only a small
amount. Similarly, promisors could communicate their disapproval of a promisee's
decision to obstruct the breach by lowering their donations. The donation decisions
provide more direct information about the judgments of participants. Previously,
participants might have accepted compensation, even though they resented the
efficient breach, because they preferred to protect their financial interests. In this
stage, participants could communicate their judgment without bearing any
financial burden.
G. Predictions
The original contract carried certain risks for participants: contracting
parties that failed to successfully complete the slider task risked losing the entire
earnings. Because B cannot exclude the possibility that the contract task may fail
(note also that this depends on A's action in completing the slider task),'0o a
rational actor should allow the breach of Contract 2 (equal division). Because this
contract splits the earnings independently of the individual contributions, the most
100. Although it was announced that the experiment consisted of two stages, the
design was not revealed.
101. In the "strategy method," a participant is requested to react to the various
possible actions of her partners in the game. Similarly, in this stage of the experiment
participants know that only one of the possible outcomes will materialize. The strategy
method was introduced in Reinhard Selten, Die Strategiemethode Zur Erforschung Des
Eingeschrankt Rationalen Verhaltens Im Rahmen Eines Oligopolexperimentes [The
Strategy Method to Explore the Limited Rational Behavior in Oligopoly under One
Experiment], in BEITRAGE ZUR EXPERIMENTELLEN WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG 136 (Heinz
Sauermann ed., J.C.B. Mohr 1967).
102. Subjects retain their original contractual partners throughout the experiment
(no re-matching).
103. Note that B and A are strangers who have not met prior to the experiment.
Player B has no prior notion of the likelihood that A will be able to complete the task
successfully.
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a participant could expect to gain from this contract is C5.104Any rational B
participant seeking to maximize her financial payoff should have allowed the
breach because it assures a certain C5 payoff. 105 This statement applied more
strongly if the B player was risk averse. 106
Along the same lines, allowing A to breach was more beneficial if B had
entered into Contract 3 (graduated division),1 0 7 unless B had highly optimistic
expectations of obtaining a higher payoff by performing the task. We minimized
the potential for overly optimistic expectations by explaining in detail the slider
task before the experiment. We highlighted the considerable difficulty and
randomness involved in positioning the sliders correctly. We emphasized that
positioning 50% more sliders than A (which was necessary to obtain more than £5)
is next to impossible.
The situation was different if B had entered into Contract 1 (merit-
based). 0 8 Here, B potentially faced a loss by absolving A and accepting the E5 as
compensation. If B expects to perform better than A, it is disadvantageous to allow
the breach. As we report in more detail below, given the degree of unpredictability
and randomness involved with the contract task, participants never selected
Contract I in the experiment.
The experimental setting created a conflict between the material interests
of the contract party, on the one hand, and the protection of the contractual
obligation, on the other.109 When participants selected Contracts 2 or 3, they
should have, for the reasons described above, preferred compensation over
enforcement.
We predicted that participants in the specific performance experimental
group would forgo the certain C5 payoff in order to have their legal entitlement
respected.1 o More specifically, we expected that the assignment of the specific
104. This contract splits the earnings independently of the individual contribution
in the total amount of successfully positioned sliders. Each party thus earns E5 as soon as
the parties manage to adjust 120 sliders correctly overall.
105. Of course, it cannot be ruled out that some B participants regarded the
successful completion of the task and contract as self-evident. Even in such instance,
however, B should be indifferent about allowing the breach or not.
106. Risk aversion describes the preference of some individuals to prefer a
bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower outcome over bargains with a higher, but
more uncertain payoff. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ASPECTS OF
THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING 90 (Yrjo Jahnssonin Saatio ed., 1965).
107. This contract divides the earnings evenly unless the faster party correctly
adjusts an additional 50% more sliders than the slower party. See supra Part H.C.
108. The Contract I option divides the payoff exclusively on the basis of the
individual performance of the contracting parties.
109. On the expressive effect of contracts, see Tontrup et al., supra note 89
(observing contract compliance even when enforcement is impossible).
110. Of course, E5 is a relatively small amount. One might object that results
might not hold up in high-stakes situations. Note, however, in cross-cultural experiments,
for instance involving ultimatum games, experimental game theory results have proven to
be very robust also in high-stakes situations. See, e.g., Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes
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performance remedy would cause participants in the experimental condition to
reveal a stronger preference to enforce the contract than respondents in the control
group. This main effect can be captured in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Participants who have a right to specific performance will
enforce the contract more often than participants in the control group.
A breach does not make any of the contracting parties worse off."' In
fact, in a Contract 2 setting, the breach presents a Pareto improvement. Player B
should welcome the breach because it results in a certain payoff of E5. On the
other hand, the efficient breach creates friction with the deontological norm that
promises must be kept. Our experiment was designed to examine the interaction
between utilitarian and deontological norms. Generally, when normative criteria
are ambiguous, the economic experimental literature has demonstrated that
individuals tend to adhere to the norm that best serves their self-interest." 2
Moreover, individuals tend to expect others to adhere to those norms, even when it
is not in the self-interest of the latter."3
Following prior literature, we expect that the breaching party will favor
the Pareto norm and will expect that the contracting partner will reason
accordingly and thus absolve her partner from the contractual duties. We assume
that this expectation will be influenced by whether specific performance is
available as a default remedy. The presence of specific performance should
weaken the expectation that the breach will be permitted. Along these lines, we
also assume that participants will be less confident' 14 that the other party will
permit the breach when specific performance is the default remedy.
in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia, 37 EcoN. INQUIRY I
(1999). The effect sizes in our experiment are comparable to the rates of rejection of offers
in traditional ultimatum games. Our scenario is not fundamentally different from either of
these prior experiments. In the ultimatum game, subjects respond to a violation of a
distributive fairness norm. From these factors, it appears not unlikely that our results might
hold in high-stakes situations.
111. A Pareto improvement makes at least one individual better off without
making anyone worse off. See DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 18-23 (1st
ed. 1983).
112. On self-serving biases in normative judgments, see Linda Babcock & George
Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. EcoN.
PERSP. 109, 110-16 (1997); see also James Konow, Fair Shares: Accountability and
Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 1072, 1088 (2000).
113. Self-serving assessments of fairness are likely to occur in morally ambiguous
settings in which competing "focal points" are salient. Examples are public-good games
with asymmetric windfall endowments. For instance, agents with the higher endowment
expect the other party to invest an equal amount, whereas the party with the lower
endowment expects proportional contributions. A violation of the expectations is perceived
as unfair by both parties. See Laurent Denant-Boemont et al., Punishment,
Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment, 33 EcoN.
THEORY 145, 165-66 (2007).
114. We will examine this by looking for a treatment effect in the confidence
measure.
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Hypothesis 2: Participants overestimate the willingness of their
counterpart to accept compensation and allow the breach of contract.
When the original contract is breached by one of the parties, players A
and C obtain extra gains from the trade, whereas B is at least no worse off and can
always obstruct the breach. The only difference between the experimental and
control groups is the nature of the remedy: While B's in both groups can prevent
the breach, only one group also has the legal right to obstruct the breach. Even
though the effect of the contract breach is identical to B players in both groups, we
expect that they will resent the breach especially when the legal remedy is
available. As described above," 5 we added a stage in the experiment where
participants could make costless donations to one another. If participants feel more
entitled to performance because they have a legal right to performance, we expect
a stronger resentment of the breach than compared to when players merely have
the actual power to prevent breach. We assume that the default remedy of specific
performance increases the perceived violation caused by the breach, inducing
higher levels of punishment.
Hypothesis 3: The sense of entitlement created by the right of specific
performance increases the subjects' sensitivity to the contract breach and,
consequently, reduces the transfer amounts.'16
Finally, we expect retaliation by A players when the efficient breach is
obstructed. As explained above, participants can be expected to react adversely to
the breach of contract. While the breaching party should focus on the gains of the
efficient breach, the victim of the breach may have less regard for the joint gains
due to his or her sensitivity to the deontological aspects of the contract breach.
These contrasting perceptions of the normative conflict should shed light on the
difficulties involved in negotiating a breach of contract.
Hypothesis 4: B players will condemn the breach, whereas A players will
resent the obstruction of the gains of trade.
H. Procedures
We conclude this Part with a brief summary of the procedures used in our
study. The experiment was partially computerized in z-Tree."' Subjects were
recruited using ORSEE." 8 Experiment and pilot studies were conducted in
115. See supra Part II.F.
116. Note, if only the breach is triggering punishment rather than assigning the
specific performance right, we should see no treatment effect.
117. z-Tree (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments) is a
software package widely used to conduct economic experiments. See Urs Fischbacher, z-
Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments, 10 EXPERIMENTAL EcoN.
171 (2007), available at http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree/index.php.
118. ORSEE is a Web-based Online Recruitment System, specifically designed to
organize economic experiments. Participants subscribe and receive an e-mail that announces
the time and date of the experiment. Ben Greiner, An Online Recruiting System for
Economic Experiments, in FORSCHUNG UND WISSENSCHAFTLIcHEs RECHNEN 79 (Kurt
Kremer & Volker Macho eds., 2003).
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Germany at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena and at the Laboratory
for Experimental Economics at Bonn University. A total (N) of 166 individuals
participated in the experiment. We divided participants in two groups (treatments):
the Specific Performance experimental group and the No Right to Enforce control
group. Subjects received a show-up fee of E4, and none of the subjects earned less
than E9. The experiment lasted 45 minutes. We collected 36 observations for each
set of participants. We examined the main effect of whether participants insisted
on enforcing the contract or accepted the breach. As confirmed in our prior pilot
studies, relatively few participants decided to adhere to the original contract after
receiving the outside offer. We excluded from the analysis those pairs of
participants in which the promisor, A, had decided not to breach the contract.119
III. FINDINGS: THE EXPRESSIVE EFFECT OF LEGAL RULES
In this Part, we report the findings of our study. Briefly summarized, we
observed that almost all promisors (A players) breached the original contract but
also expected to be discharged from performance upon payment of expectation
damages. In response, most promisees (B players) tended to enforce the original
contract when specific performance was the default remedy. Promisors did not
expect that promisees would enforce the contract. The lower donations suggest that
efficient breaches induced more resentment among promisees when a specific
performance remedy was available.
A. Compliance with the Original Contract
As expected, nearly all participants breached the original contract with
the original promisee (B). The experiment was designed to encourage breach: A
promisor (A) is aware that, far from being detrimental, the breach is at least mildly
beneficial to the promisee as well. Damage compensation is preferable to the
promisee even if she is risk neutral. Risk aversion about the task reinforced the
self-interest in breaching the contract.120
B. Enforcement by the Promisee
We compare the frequency of enforcement by promisees across our two
treatments. In Hypothesis 1, we posited that participants would enforce the
contract, especially when specific performance was the default remedy.
The results can be summarized in a simple 2 x 2 contingency table.
119. The even number of 36 observations in both treatments is coincidental.
120. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Above, we clarified that this holds for
Contracts 2 and 3. See supra Part II.G.
121. We use the term enforcement here in the broad sense of inducing
performance by the promisor. Where necessary, we distinguish between legal enforcement
(on the basis of specific performance) and the informal enforcement measure (causing
withdrawal of the outside offer).
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As illustrated in Figure 1 below, we obtained strong, statistically
significant evidence for Hypothesis 1.122 Participants in the specific performance
experimental group enforced the contract more than subjects in the control group.
Figure 1. Percentage of Subjects Enforcing the Original Contract:
















Additionally, all of the 17 participants who enforced the contract in the
specific performance experimental group enforced the contract on the basis of the
legal default-no one relied on the non-legal enforcement option (where the third
party would withdraw the offer).
Despite the fact that the contract breach was Pareto efficient-making at
least one individual better off without making anyone worse off-most
participants in the specific performance experimental group obstructed the
122. A 2 x 2 Pearson's chi-square test yielded a score of 10.356, a strongly
significant effect with a two-tailed p-value of p=0.001, which is below our level of
significance of a=0.05. Because we had only six observations in the No-Right/Enforcement
cell of our contingency table, we confirmed our results with Fisher's exact test. The test
yielded a significant result: A two-tailed p-value of p=0.010, which is below our test level
of a=0.05, the one-tailed p-value being p=0.005.
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breach. 123 This suggests that respecting the contract (pacta sunt servanda) is an
important value to promisees when the contractual obligations are protected by a
default of specific performance. 124
C. The Breaching Party's Expectations About Enforcement
In Hypothesis 2, we predicted that when promisors (participants in the
role of A) breached the contract, they would underestimate the negative reaction of
the promisee (B) to the efficient breach. We compared the results of the
enforcement expectations of promisors (A) with the actual decisions of the
promisees. We display the data in a 2 x 4 contingency table:
Table 2. Actual v. Expected Enforcement
Participants Specific Specific No Specific No Specific
Choose to Performance Performance Performance Performance
Enforce the Condition Condition: Condition Condition:
Contract Expected Expected
Enforcement Enforcement
Yes 17 9 8 6
No 19 27 28 30
Figure 2. Specific Performance:








Partner Enforces Expectation of
Enforcement
123. See supra Table 1.
124. Also, we observed a small but insignificant difference in the amount of B
participants who declined the outside offer (four in the No Right to Enforce group and seven
in the Specific Performance group).
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In support of Hypothesis 2, we find significant evidence of a disparity
between the expectations of contracting parties when specific performance was the
remedy, 125 Promisees enforced more often than promisees had expected.
Interestingly, expectations and enforcement decisions matched each other perfectly
in the control group (no specific performance). These findings suggest that when
there was a specific performance default, promisees regarded efficient breaches as
much more objectionable than promisors. Also, promisors failed to anticipate the
influence of specific performance on a promisee's decision to enforce the contract.
D. Confidence in Estimations
We measured the confidence of: (1) promisees' predictions whether their
promisor would breach the contract; and (2) promisors' predictions whether they
would be held to the original contract by their promisee.
We observed a significant but small treatment effect: When the contract
specified specific performance, participants were less confident (investing a mean
amount of 46.9 cents) than when no specific performance was provided (54.8
cents).126
This result suggests that participants in the specific performance group
were less confident, as compared to participants in the control group, that their
contractual partner would accept compensation and release them from
performance. Even though participants in the control group failed to anticipate that
the promisee would enforce the contract when specific performance was the
default, their confidence in the expectation that they would be released from the
original contract dropped significantly when specific performance applied. 2 7
E. Costless Donations After Breach or Performance
In Stage 2 of the experiment, both parties received an endowment of up to
Cl that they could donate to the other party. Regardless of the selected amount, the
participants would not retain the remaining amount of money. Implicitly, by
transferring lower amounts, participants were able to indicate their disapproval
with the behavior of the other party.
To avoid misunderstandings, we explicitly clarified in the instructions
that no one would retain the residual amount. We asked promisees to indicate how
125. A 2 x 2 Pearson's chi-square test yielded a score of 3.853, a significant effect
with a two-tailed p-value of p=0.049, which is below our significance level of a-=0.05. We
confirmed our results with Fisher's exact test. The test yielded a significant result, a one-
tailed right p-value of p=0.042, which is below our test level of c=0.05.
126. To test for significance, we conducted a t-test for independent samples. We
found a two-sided result of p=0.057 (one-sided result p=0.0 2 9), with a confidence level of
c =0.05.
127. Because most breaching promisors expected to be relieved from the original
contract, we have fewer observations for participants that expected enforcement. The level
of confidence here seems relatively consistent across treatment groups (56.8 cents in the
experimental group and 57.5 cents in the control treatment), but given the small number of
observations we should not try to draw conclusions from this result.
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much they would donate if the contract was breached and when it was fulfilled.'28
We compared the results for our two treatments. We observed that participants
donated lower amounts if the contract was breached when specific performance
was the remedy (a mean transfer of only 37.05 cents).129 By contrast, when
specific performance was not available an average transfer of 60.38 cents
occurred. 30
When participants assumed that the promisor decided not to accept the
outside offer, the donations were especially large."' Only small differences existed
between the experimental (a mean of 92.72 cents) and the control group (85.27
cents).
The donation stage allows us to better understand the motives of contract
enforcement. If a promisee harbors no resentment but simply wants to protect her
right to enforce the contract, she might do so and still donate the full amount of
money or at least some large fraction of it. But if a promisee strongly disapproves
of the breach, it might be reflected in much smaller donations.
The findings indicate that efficient breach generated considerable
resentment when specific performance was the default remedy. In that case,
promisees donated only one-third of the endowment-that is, they preferred to
relinquish two-thirds of the endowment rather than have it end up in the hands of
the promisor. Interestingly, when specific performance was not applicable as the
default, promisees did not react as adversely to an efficient breach.
Also, when the promisee was informed that the contract was not
breached, participants donated much larger sums to the promisor. This is puzzling
because in our setting, the promisor and promisee are better off financially if the
contract is breached. By breaching, the promisor removes the uncertainty that the
promisee has regarding the successful completion of the task and the E5 payoff.132
This suggests that the intrinsic value of contract performance outweighed some of
the financial benefits of the contract when a default of specific performance
applied.
128. We employed the strategy method in this stage of the experiment: subjects
state contingent choices for every potential decision that they face. See Selten, supra note
101, at 136-68.
129. While subjects could only make binary choices in the rest of the experiment,
here the participants made use of the opportunity to quantify their approval more precisely
in the continuous measure (0-100 cents). In contrast to our expectation to get polar
transfers-either you approve the breach/enforcement or you do not-participants often
indicated amounts in the order of 90 or 75 cents.
130. A t-test for independent samples showed a one-tailed p-value of p=0. 0 3 7
with a=0.05.
131. In fact, the donations were so high that it caused a ceiling effect in both the
treatment and control groups. A ceiling effect occurs when there is no window to find a
treatment effect. Here, for example, the maximum is 100 cents. In order to obtain a
significant effect relative to the 88.72 cents, participants would need to transfer some
amount above 100 cents, which is impossible given that the endowment is only 100 cents.
132. We distinguish of course between Contracts 1, 2, and 3. See supra Part II.C.
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Finally, the experiment also measured the disapproval of the breaching
promisor when the disappointed promisee had obstructed the efficient breach. We
asked participants to consider a donation while imagining that the breach was
accepted and the contract was enforced. We compared the transfers in both
hypothetical situations and across the experimental and control groups.133 When
promisors assumed that the breach was accepted, they transferred 86 cents. By
contrast, when the efficient breach was denied they transferred only 22 cents. So,
despite being subject to a valid, enforceable contract, promisors who breached the
contract resented the other party for insisting on fulfillment of the contract. This
result demonstrates how deep the normative conflict is between the contracting
parties when specific performance is available. Each contracting party disapproves
of the other's decision.
F. Motivations ofPromisees
To shed light on the motivations of each of the participants, we presented
promisees (B players) with an open format questionnaire at the conclusion of the
experiment. 134
We asked the promisees about their motivations when they enforced the
contract in the specific performance condition. Almost all respondents stated that
contracts should be fulfilled (15/17).
Some respondents indicated that they sought to protect themselves from
the violation of their legal right (10/17). A little over half of the respondents
indicated that they did not want their investments in the task to be pointless (9/17).
Participants who allowed the breach were motivated primarily by the
certain payoff of 65 (13/19) and acknowledged that they could help the other party
without suffering a loss (15/19).
Participants in the control group appeared to have a motivation that the
other participants in the experimental group did not share. Some deemed
compensatory damages as a fair outcome (7/36). This suggests that the legal
framework influenced fairness benchmarks. When specific performance was
available, participants evaluated breach negatively in light of fairness
considerations regarding cooperation and defection. Without the specific
performance default, participants perceived the breach in a more utilitarian sense,
focusing on the gains from trade.
Overall, contract enforcers focused on the moral aspects of the breach,
whereas participants who allowed the breach were more focused on the gains from
trade that would result for themselves and their contractual partner. Two
independent raters (student assistants) classified the motivations, which we termed
133. A two-tailed t-test yielded a p-value of p-0.000 with a-0.05.
134. We are aware that the responses might represent ex post rationalizations of
prior choices and that deliberation would not uncover the unconscious reasons that drove
the subject's motivations during the experiment. Nevertheless, the resulting qualitative
evidence aligned well with the behavioral data and the motivations we provided in our
hypothesis as driving factors for the entitlement effect of the default remedy.
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deontological for those participants who insisted on keeping the contract per se
and utilitarian for those who focused on the gains from trade. The motivations fit
to the behavioral data. Significantly more participants reported having a
deontological motivation for their decision when specific performance applied. By
comparison, in the control group a majority indicated that utilitarian motives
influenced their decisions.'3 5 To summarize, participants' moral intuitions about
contract breach depended on the particular institutional legal setting. Individual
decisions were not fixed by moral priors but were instead affected by the legal
framework.
G. Motivations and Expectations ofPromisors
We also presented questionnaires to promisors (A players) in order to
understand the motivations for breaching the contract or declining the outside
offer, and to gauge the expectations of promisors.
Participants in the specific performance experimental group (n=27), who
held the expectation that the other party would allow the breach, emphasized that
the other contracting partner had nothing to lose by allowing the breach (22/27). A
majority of respondents added that promisees should prefer the guaranteed C5
payoff over the uncertain payoff that would result in the case of performance
(15/27). Some participants emphasized that the promisee should not object to the
breach because "money is money," regardless of whether it was earned from the
original contract performance or as compensation resulting from breach (10/27).
Only a few participants (n=9) expected enforcement by the promisee.
When expected, promisors believed that enforcement might be induced by a sense
of betrayal (6/9) and/or a desire to punish the breaching party (5/9). A majority
indicated that they expected that the other party might resent not being able to
share more in the additional gains obtained by the promisor and would thus seek to
foil these gains by blocking the trade with C (5/9). Finally, two participants
indicated that they expected that the promisee would enforce the original contract
without feeling guilty about spoiling the additional gains of trade, because the
legal default justified it. It is remarkable that so few participants anticipated the
entitlement effect of specific performance.
The motivations of participants, as obtained from our questionnaires,
nicely matched our behavioral data: Promisors approached the breach from a
strictly utilitarian framework, focusing nearly exclusively on the gains from trade.
All but one promisor provided utilitarian justifications for their decision to breach
the contract. We observed little difference across the treatments, which suggests
that specific performance did not significantly affect the motives of promisors. 36
This stands in contrast to the deontological viewpoints of promisees when specific
performance was the default.'3 7
135. The comparison of both treatments is based on a Fisher test p=0.03.
136. The comparison based on a Fisher test was p=0.00.
137. See infra Part IV.A.
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Finally, promisors seemed to expect that promisees would not enforce the
contract. By failing to recognize how the entitlement effect influences promisees'
moral evaluation of the breach, promisors perhaps assumed that the enforcement
preference of the promisee was motivated by mere spite. As a result, promisors
seemed to punish their contractual partner by withholding costless donations in the
final round. Meanwhile, promisees focused on the ethical obligation to perform the
contract. When the promisor had breached the contract, promisees likewise
punished their contractual partner by withholding costless donations to the
promisor. As we discuss in more detail in the next section, these competing
normative viewpoints on contract breach likely complicate private bargaining
between parties.
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. The Contextual Nature of Immoral Breach
The sanctity of a promise is considered a strongly resonant moral
principle.'38 Most individuals believe that breaking a promise is immoral.3 9
Although it is well recognized that legal and moral obligations do not
always coincide,140 there is some consensus that a legally valid contract also
imposes certain moral obligations on a promisor.141 Indeed, cultural psychologists
138. On the moral obligations that result from making promises, see, for example,
JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 308-10 (1st ed. 1980) (the binding force
of promises is justified by promises' coordination providing attributes); FRIED, supra note 9,
at 14-17 (a promisor incurs a moral obligation by intentionally invoking a social convention
whose purpose is to cause others to expect the promised performance); DAVID HUME, A
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. 2, § 5 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1739); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF
MORALS 90 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Rowe 1964) (1785) (promise-keeping is one of
four illustrations of the categorical imperative: Keeping promises would make promising,
and the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, "since no one would believe he was
being promised anything"); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 15, 32, 38 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785);
Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY AND SOCIETY 210, 222 (P.M.S.
Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., Clarendon Press 1977) (promises bar factors that might
otherwise be a reason not to perform the contractually described actions ("exclusionary
reasons")); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 42-69 (1st ed. 1986); DAVID Ross,
THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 16-47 (Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (1930); J.L. MACKIE,
ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 110-11, 116-18, 184-85 (1st ed. 1977) (deriving
from Hobbes and Hume the notion that it is in a promisor's self-interest to keep his word);
John Rawls, Two Concepts ofRules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 14 (1955) (a promise removes from a
promisor certain preferences not to perform, although these might otherwise be perfectly
proper grounds on which to refuse to make a promise in the first place).
139. See infra Part IV.A.
140. A moral obligation is something we ought to do or refrain from doing,
evaluated on one or more normative criteria of justice. A positive legal obligation, by
contrast, is an obligation that a legal system enforces.
141. For empirical evidence, see, for example, Feldman & Teichman, supra note
84, at 31-32 (showing that moral evaluations about contract performance are affected by
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have identified the rule of contract as one of only three universal moral norms.142
A broad field of philosophy of contracts scholarship has attempted to describe and
define the source of contract as a moral obligation. 143 Several principles are
invoked to justify the use of legal force to enforce legally binding contracts:
consent,144 Wll 145 expectations, 146 reliance, 147 efficiency, 148 fairness,149 and
bargaining.15 0
non-monetary aspects, such as the source of uncertainty regarding damage payments and the
type of contract); Wilkinson-Ryan & Baron, supra note 86 at 405 (providing survey-based
experimental evidence). Scholars have defined the potential overlap between moral and
legal obligations as "valid legal obligations"-namely, obligations that are morally
appropriate to enforce. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness
Inquiry and the "Law of Satisfaction "-A Nonunfed Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349, 377
(1995) (proposing that contract law serves values such as "certainty of contract,
predictability, morality, fairness, and justice"); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 644-48 (1958); H. L. A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593, 621-24 (1958);
Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1551, 1564
(2009) ("The idea that performance matters is a difficult point to support directly. It is the
sort of position toward which one tends to be drawn by instinct rather than led by explicit
direction."). But see, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 172-215 (1st ed.
1981) (expressing the view that contracts are promises but that neither are a source of
obligation); Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 155-223 (1st
ed. 2002); Shavell, supra note 8, at 466-69; Shavell, Breach Immoral?, supra note 36, at
439. See also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 304-12,
338-55, 638-40 (2004); Shavell, Breach Not Immoral, supra note 36, at 1570 (When
recognizing that contracts are unavoidably incomplete, intended promises should be kept
but not unintended ones. Arguing that, if a contingency is not explicitly addressed in the
contract, then the moral duty to perform in the contingency is governed by what a
completely detailed contract addressing the contingency would have stipulated.).
142. In a recent paper, Tontrup et al. observe that promises are broken more easily
than contracts. See Tontrup et al., supra note 89. For additional experimental evidence of
promise-keeping as a moral commitment, see Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg,
Promises and Partnership, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1579 (2006); Christoph Vanberg, Why Do
People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations, 76
ECONOMETRICA 1467 (2008).
143. As Randy Barnett describes, "the principal task of legal theory . . . is to
identify circumstances when legal enforcement is morally justified." Barnett, supra note 14,
at 299. Determining the moral character of obligations is the province of political
philosophy. See LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 1-2 (rev. ed. 1969); ROBERT NoziCK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONs 503 (1981) ("Political philosophy . .. is mainly the theory of
what behavior legitimately may be enforced, and of the nature of the institutional structure
that stays within and supports these enforceable rights . . . . In no way does political
philosophy or the realm of the state exhaust the realm of the morally desirable or moral
oughts."). See generally ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 78-86, 123-26 (1984)
(biography including discussion of Fuller's view of contracts).
144. Following this theory, "the consent of the rights holder to be legally
obligated is the moral component that distinguishes valid from invalid transfers of alienable
rights in a system of entitlements." Barnett, supra note 14, at 299. As such, legal
enforcement is morally justified because the promisor voluntarily performed acts that
conveyed her intention to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable
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Moral criteria are often used to advocate for particular remedies for
breach. 51 The consent theory of contract law, for instance, considers contract
breach unethical. This is because once a contract is consented to the legal
entitlement to performance belongs to the promisee.152 From this vantage point,
specific performance provides the more obvious remedy for most, but not all,
instances of breach. Similarly, normative, utilitarian theories of wealth
maximization are applied in the law and economic literature to argue both in favor
of and against specific performance as the appropriate remedy for breach.153
Our study does not set out to contest any particular philosophical
perspective on contract breach. Nor do we aim to develop a new philosophical
theory on the moral foundations of contracts. Rather, our study provides
rights. Id at 304 ("The consent that is required is a manifestation of an intention to alienate
rights."); see also P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 177 (1981) ("[P]romising
may be reducible to a species of consent, for consent is a broader and perhaps more basic
source of obligation.").
145. ATIYAH, supra note 144.
146. A promise may give rise to expectations in the promisee and the fact that
nonperformance would disappoint those expectations may count as a reason favoring
performance. For examples of this theory, see Pall S. Ardal, And That's a Promise, 18 PHIL.
Q. 225, 233-37 (1968); Jan Narveson, Promising, Expecting, and Utility, 1 CAN. J. PHIL.
207, 213-20 (1971); see also R. S. Downie, Three Accounts of Promising, 35 PHIL. Q. 259,
263-64 (1985) (attributing this argument to Adam Smith).
147. Theorists who focus on the promisee's reliance include: L.L Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 53-56
(1936); Neil MacCormick & Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, 46
ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y. 59, 62-63 (Supp. Vol. 1972); see also HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT
LAW & MORALITY 10 (1999) (arguing that enforcement is necessary to protect relying
promisees or other persons from serious harm resulting from detrimental reliance). But see
Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 99, 154-61 (2000)
(critiquing the classic classification of damages in expectation, reliance, and restitution and
proposing a novel division into remedies above expectation, remedies that approximate
expectation, and remedies below expectation).
148. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An
Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265-66 (1980) (enforceable
contracts increase social utility by enabling reliance by contracting parties).
149. See supra Part I.B.
150. See supra Part I.B.
151. As Richard Craswell has pointed out, however, philosophical theories of
contractual obligations do not necessarily provide direct answers on specific issues in
contract law, such as the optimal interpretation of contracts or the content of substantive
rules in contract law. "As that literature is concerned with the question of how promises
could bind even in the best of circumstances, its focus is implicitly limited to cases where
there is no question that a promise has been made, and no difficulty in determining the exact
content of the promised action." Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the
Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 505 (1989) (arguing that much of the
current philosophical debate about the binding force of promises is irrelevant to contract
law's choice of background rules).
152. Barnett, supra note 14, at 311.
153. See supra Part I.B.
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descriptive insight into the moral beliefs that individuals hold about contract
breach. In this regard, our findings provide some empirical grounding for the
utilitarian concept of efficient breach.1 54
Our experiment was designed so that the conditions most relevant to the
moral judgment of a breach of contract were held constant throughout the
experiment. Efficient breach generated the same surplus in all conditions, identical
expectation damages were guaranteed, contracts were based on clear consent
expressed by both parties, and identical bargaining procedures were applied
throughout.'55
Even when participants were better off financially if they accepted
compensation (expectation damages), disappointed promisees in the specific
performance experimental group generally insisted on performance of the contract.
Although all players were able to prevent breach and obtain performance, the mere
availability of a default remedy of "specific performance" caused players in the
experimental group to forsake the certain E5 payoff in order to have their legal
entitlement respected.'
On first glance, contract enforcement could be understood as a way to
retaliate against the promisor's decision to breach the contract. Promisees decided
to forsake their immediate material interests in compensation, but perhaps they
derived some utility from acting spitefully. Indeed, the decision not to make
costless donations to the other party suggests that contract breach generated
considerable resentment.'
There are several possible reasons why a promisee might object to the
efficient breach: a promise was broken, the original promisee does not get to share
in the gains generated by the outside offer, or no prior permission was asked of the
promisee. These circumstances were present in both groups of participants, yet
only the group with the specific performance default regarded the breach as
immoral.'5 8 This suggests that the specific performance default specifically
generated a sense of entitlement, fueling the observed actions.
Because promisees objected more strongly to the efficient breach when
the default remedy was specific performance, our results suggest that the latent
legal remedy caused a strong moral objection to the efficient breach. Although the
default did not affect a promisee's financial payoffs, it made contract breach more
objectionable if specific performance applied. In other words, not all efficient
154. In this regard, our experiment provides information for sociological and
bottom-up normative theories of morality in contract obligations.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See supra Part III.B.
157. See supra Part III.E.
158. Similarly, other regarding preferences do not fully account for the observed
differences between the experimental and control group. If concern for C drives the result in
the control group, something must explain that this concern is muted in the experimental
group. Note again that promisees in the control groups (no default remedy of specific
performance) were able to likewise prevent the breach. Once the promisee expressed this
desire, the third party withdrew the outside offer.
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breaches are treated the same-a breach of contract is deemed more objectionable
in a legal context where a promisee is assured of specific performance as the
default remedy. Even though contracting parties have the freedom to contract
around the remedy, the selected default defines how the breach of contract is
perceived. One possible interpretation is that a default of specific performance
makes the ethical norm to perform the contract more salient.1 59
In a fascinating article, Charles Goetz and Robert Scott noticed a
tendency of courts to transform default rules into mandatory rules. 60 Goetz and
Scott observed that courts treat legislatively created defaults as presumptively fair,
resisting alternative rules. Our data indicates that a similar effect is at work with
regard to promisees in our experiment. When provided with the opportunity to
make costless donations, participants in the specific performance default group
showed remarkably strong punishment sentiments.16' Anonymous questionnaires
confirmed that these promisees harbored a strong sense of resentment against the
efficient breach. Overall, our results suggest that lawmakers' choice of the default
remedy affects contracting parties' moral evaluation of contract breaches. In other
words, moral intuitions are endogenous to the applicable legal rule; law itself
frames the moral intuitions. From the questionnaires conducted at the conclusion
of the experiment, we learned that promisors and promisees adopted different
moral frameworks when evaluating possible justifications for breach. Promisors
seemed to adhere to the wealth-maximizing criterion, focusing on the gains from
efficient breach to justify breach upon payment of expectation damages.'16 2
Promisees, on the other hand, focused on the immoral aspects of the contract
breach and the unequal distribution of the gains resulting from the contract
breach.'63
In the remainder of this Article, we further explore the dynamics and
causes of this effect. We also discuss the policy implications.
159. Specifically, a lawmaker's decision to implement specific performance as the
default remedy might be perceived as a collective commitment to performance as the
relevant norm. For more on this interpretation, see infra Part IV.C.
160. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 261, 263-64 (1985); see Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise,
77 CORNELL L. REv. 1022, 1025 (1992) (expressing criticism that a moral theory of
promising alone would have courts enforcing purely moral commitments, "which is
tantamount to legislating virtue").
161. See supra Part Ui.E. Compare mean transfer of 37.05 cents (experimental
specific performance group) versus average transfers of 60.38 cents (control group).
162. According to wealth maximization theory, justice is best served by
maximizing aggregate wealth. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoMICS OF JUSTICE 115
(1981).
163. Distributive justice concerns itself with the way benefits and burdens are
distributed. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 165 (rev. ed.
1990).
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B. The Entitlement Effect of Specific Performance
As described above, a specific performance default influenced the moral
evaluation of contract breach. But what made the resentment so strong that
promisees decided to forsake the immediate benefits of the damage remedy in
favor of the more uncertain return from performance?
One potential explanation for this fascinating result is that the contractual
default of specific performance may have created a sense of entitlement among
promisees. When specific performance is the official legal remedy, promisees felt
more entitled to the performance of the contract. As a result, contract breach and
damage compensation became less acceptable.
A rich body of evidence in cognitive psychology shows that individuals
place a higher value on items or opportunities that they possess than those they
have the option to possess.164 The endowment effect is commonly explained by the
observation that losses loom larger than gains,'16  a bias also known as "loss
aversion."' In this context, scholars have argued that remedies are not neutral as
to the outcome of negotiations. Even if transaction costs are low and parties are
free to bargain, the legal status quo might affect the end result because the initial
allocation of rights may influence the value of the underlying resource.1
The endowment effect has also been documented in the context of legal
rules and enforcement. For instance, in their classic review of behavioral effects,
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler suggest that parties who are
awarded a legal privilege by a judge are unlikely to bargain away this right, even if
the opposing litigant values the entitlement more strongly, because they are likely
to believe they have earned the endowment.168 In a theoretical contribution, Russel
Korobkin has suggested that contracting parties may view substantive default rules
as status quo endowments. Because individuals tend to prefer "the status quo to
alternative states, they are likely to prefer the default term, whatever it may be, to
164. For this reason, the endowment effect is often described as the gap between
the willingness to pay ("WTP") and the willingness to accept ("WTA"). See Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 64, 89-90 (1993).
165. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 120, at 279.
166. See, e.g., Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measures
of Value, 99 Q. J. EcoN. 507, 509-20 (1984) (providing evidence on loss aversion in
experiment involving buying and selling of lottery tickets); Charles R. Plott & Kathryn
Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay- Willingness to Accept Gap, the "Endowment Effect, " Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. EcoN. REv.
530 (2005) (presenting methodological clarifications).
167. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1325 (1990).
168. Christine Jolts et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1497-1501 (1998); see also Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. Cmu. L. REv. 373,
381-91, 421 (1999) (documenting the remarkable absence of post-judgment bargaining in
nuisance cases).
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other options, all other things being equal." 69 Finally, Jeffrey Rachinski and
Forest Jourden showed, on the basis of questionnaires involving hypothetical
nuisance disputes, that endowment effects are stronger with regard to resources
that are protected by property rules than by liability rules.o7 0
Our study provides a novel extension of the endowment effect. Rachlinski
and Jourden described how property rule protection may induce an increased
concern about conservation of natural resources (protection of ponds for migratory
birds, rare plants, etc.).'71 This suggests that the legal framework influences how
people value the property. In our study, by contrast, right holders appear to
experience violations of their right as a cost in and of itself Note that the goal of
the original contract was to earn money. By rejecting damage compensation and
enforcing the original contract, promisors passed up on the opportunity to
immediately accomplish this goal with absolute certainty. Instead of viewing their
contractual rights instrumentally as a means to an end, the right itself attained
intrinsic value to promisees when specific performance was available. The
immediate material effects of the breach of contract were no longer the exclusive
concern of promisees-the violation of the legal right imposed a psychological
cost and, consequently, a preference for enforcement.
This suggests that even if transaction costs are low and parties are free to
bargain, the initial allocation of rights affects the value parties assign to their
rights.172 The entitlement effect causes contracting parties to value the right to
169. Russel Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 608, 675 (1998) (questioning claims of optimality based on revealed
preference in light of the status quo bias with regard to substantive contract law rules).
170. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1541, 1545 (1998). Our Article shares some common ground
with this project. But there are important differences even beyond the major distinctions in
subject matter (property law remedies as opposed contract law default remedies) and the
methodology of the empirical investigation (hypothetical rather than actual decision-making
with real contracts and payoffs). As described in the text above following this footnote, we
offer a different interpretation of the results (entitlement effect rather than basic loss
version). In contract law, a rule that permits the promisor to breach provided that
compensation is paid to the promisee is a liability rule. See Kronman, supra note 15, at 352.
By contrast, specific performance works as an injunction in the sense that the promisee has
the right to insist on performance unless the promisor negotiates a voluntary transfer of the
entitlement. YoRIo, supra note 1, at § 1.2; see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. In
this regard, our findings extend some of the insights made in the context of property and
liability rules in property law disputes.
171. Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 170.
172. In this regard, the endowment effect modifies the findings of the Coase
Theorem that initial allocations of rights do not impact the end result if transaction costs are
low. Id. at 1545 ("The endowment effect itself implies that a fundamental aspect of the
Coase Theorem is wrong-the initial allocation of a right appears to change people's
preferences. If the endowment effect depends upon injunctive relief, however, Coase
accurately described rights protected by liability rules, but inaccurately described rights
protected by property rules."); see R. H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN.
1 (1960).
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performance independently from the instrumental purpose of the specific contract.
In our study, the entitlement effect was so strong that promisees enforced the
contract, even though they would be better off financially if they agreed to receive
the compensatory damage award. 173
C. Specific Performance as an Expressive Default
Our results suggest that legislatively-created defaults are regarded as
presumptively fair by promisees, causing them to find fault with later deviations
from the defaults.
A related strand of literature states that legal rules, especially if
formulated by lawmakers that are perceived to be legitimate, have an expressive
effect and align individual preferences with the goals expressed in the enacted
norms.174 One of the most prominent concepts to emerge from this literature is the
so-called "expressive function of the law."' 75 By expressing a collective
commitment, it is argued, laws can cause individuals to align their behavior with
legal commands.176 Although rational choice theory generally assumes that
173. In contract law, a rule that permits the promisor to breach provided that
compensation is paid to the promisee is a liability rule. See Kronman, supra note 15, at 352.
By contrast, specific performance works as an injunction in the sense that the promisee has
the right to insist on performance unless the promisor negotiates a voluntary transfer of the
entitlement. YoRio, supra note 1, at § 1.2; see supra notes 26-27. In this regard, our
findings extend some of the insights made in the context of property and liability rules in
property law disputes. See supra note 78.
174. When law creates a focal point by expressing values that might tip norms to
a new equilibrium, this process may create a social norm or internalize a normative value.
See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 225-30 (1996); Cooter, supra note 32, at
585. The idea of law as a focal point that coordinates expectations among citizens is
explored further in McAdams, supra note 32, at 1649.
175. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical
Overview, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1363 (2000); Matthew D. Adler, Linguistic Meaning,
Nonlinguistic "Expression" and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to
Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1582 (2000); Elizabeth S.
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories ofLaw: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 1503, 1505 (2000) (law has a normative value based on what it expresses,
independent of its consequences); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law:
Expression, Deterrence and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REv. 1, 22 (2000); see supra note 32.
176. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 597 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 958-61 (1995); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law's
Expressive Function, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1039, 1040-44 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Why
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 725, 725-26 (1998); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 471-73 (1997); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2022; Janice
Nadler, The Effects of Perceived Injustice on Deference to the Law (Feb. 23, 2000)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). For a more
formal, economic account, see Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An
Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1593-94 (2000); Cooter,
supra note 32, at 585-96.
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individuals have independent and stable preferences,1 7 7 behavioral science
literature has presented convincing evidence that, far from being fixed and stable,
individuals' preferences are influenced by non-substantive factors, such as the way
possible options are framed, the presence of sunk costs, and the presence of prior
cues or anchors.'7 8 Similarly legal rules can work as anchors, causing individuals
to eventually internalize the preferences embodied in the legal rule. Individuals
comply with legal commands (e.g. do not smoke in public, clean up after your
dog) not merely because of the fear of possible sanctions, but because individuals
either internalize the preferences stated in the law or hold the belief that others
have done so.'7 9 The mere expression of the "socially desirable" behavior can set a
focal point that coordinates individual behavior in society. From this perspective,
our experiment demonstrates that legal default remedies can influence the
normative viewpoints of contracting parties.18 0
The entitlement effect and the expressive function of the law may work
simultaneously to shape the preferences of the right holder. More specifically, if
the expressive effect increases the perceived legitimacy of the assigned right it
likely strengthens the sense of entitlement among right holders.
Interestingly, the phenomena of entitlement and expressive law are
regarded as having very different welfare effects. While the entitlement effect is
177. See Dan Ariely et al., "Coherent Arbitrariness ": Stable Demand Curves
Without Stable Preferences, 118 Q.J. EcoN. 73, 73 (2003) ("Economic theories of valuation
generally assume that prices of commodities and assets are derived from underlying
'fundamental' values" attached to those commodities.").
178. For an overview, see Jolls et al., supra note 168, at 1497-1501.
179. An alternate viewpoint on the expressive function of the law, regards the
effect of law to be that of coordinating the behavior of others. Legal rules, in this
perspective, do not necessarily change the preferences of individuals, as much as they alter
the expectations of what others will do. In this manner, legal commands can work as focal
points. The seminal contribution is Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-53 (2000). For an experimental analysis of
coordination or framing as a cause of behavioral changes induced by legal regulation, see
Iris Bohnet & Robert Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?,
(HARVARD UNIVERSITY, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, Working Paper Series,
RWPO3-046, 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=452420.
180. In this regard, this Article extends to contract default remedies, the notion
that "[p]erhaps society learns what to value in part through the legal system's descriptions
of our protected spheres." Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. Rev. 669, 695 (1979) (noting that "[p]erhaps
society learns what to value in part through the legal system's descriptions of our protected
spheres"); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 933-
39 (1996). The content of contract default rules can change the preferences of contracting
parties over time by stamping the imprimatur of the legal system on certain substantive
rules. The expressive power of legal rules has also been suggested in the context of
substantive default rules in contract law. See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The
Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. Rev. 1815, 1879 (1991) ("[Iln
some instances, application of the rule will persuade parties that it is correct . . . .").
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considered as a possible impediment to value-maximizing transactions,'' the
expressive effect of the law is generally heralded in the literature as benevolent
because it reduces the costs of enforcement.' 82 Our study suggests that the
expressive function may also be costly. Even when promisees would have been
strictly better off by accepting damage compensation, we observed that
participants in the specific performance experimental group decided instead to
impede the socially beneficial outcome. By enforcing the original contract,
promisees blocked the mutual gains from trade between the promisor and C.
Although all players were able to prevent breach and obtain performance, the mere
availability of a default remedy of "specific performance" caused promisees to
forsake the certain C5 payoff. 83 Specific performance dissipated the gains of trade
between the promisor and C.18 4
D. Specific Performance and Moral Transaction Costs
Specific performance has been understood to facilitate bargaining'"
because clear property rights foster efficient trading.'86 Our findings suggest,
however, that the right to performance may become a value in itself. The
contractual duty to fulfill the agreement may become more important than the goal
of the contract itself, which is a good outcome. We have shown that a specific
performance default can induce deep resentment against contract breach, whereby
the breach might be perceived as an insult that cannot as easily be traded for
187
material compensation.
181. See supra note 175.
182. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, The Condorcet
Jury Theorem and the Expressive Function ofLaw: A Theory ofInformative Law, 5 AM. L.
& ECON. REv. 1, 4 (2003). See also Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the
Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an
Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 87, 116-17 (2005) (showing
that law enables coordination problems by allowing individuals to form expectations about
what others are likely to do).
183. Another potential explanation is that parties have trouble agreeing on an
alternative to the default. Given that the choice of the remedy was a unilateral decision by
the promisee, this interpretation is less relevant in the context of our experiment. Randolph
Sloofet al., On the Importance ofDefault Breach Remedies, 163 J. INsT. & TH. EcoN. 5, 19
(2007) (observing that parties often remain loyal to the default remedies because they fail to
agree about possible alternatives).
184. It must be recognized, of course, that enforcing the contract default may
create additional value to the promisee. When taking into account emotional and symbolic
factors involved with contract breach, the promisor's value in performance may well exceed
the monetary gains involved with the alterative.
185. See supra note 173.
186. POSNER, supra note 63, at 88-89.
187. Legal rights are not always "commensurable": individuals are reluctant to
trade the legal entitlement for material compensation. See Sunstein, supra note 180, at 943-
44 (suggesting that people may be unwilling to accept money as compensation for allowing
a disagreeable outcome that is not normally measured in monetary terms). See generally
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNEss 294, 296 (1986) (noting Aristoles'
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As has been pointed out in the literature on incommensurable rights,
individuals are sometimes reluctant to trade their legal entitlement for material
compensation or otherwise demand a premium to compensate for the compromise
of entering into such a transaction.' 8 8 As a result, it might become difficult for a
promisor to convince a promisee to voluntarily accept damage compensation in
lieu of performance. If courts enforce the default,'8 9 it may prevent some efficient
breaches. If promisors anticipate a difficult negotiation process, some promisors
might turn away more lucrative opportunities that necessitate breaching the
original contract.
Returning to the economic literature on specific performance,190 our
observations question the comparative advantage of specific performance
highlighted in the current literature. If the remedy of specific performance triggers
deontological moral viewpoints about contract performance, efficient breach will
be more difficult. Rather than fostering utilitarian goals of contract law, specific
performance complicates private bargaining and the attainment of economically
maximizing transactions.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have argued that the current literature on contract law
underestimates the effect of legal rules on moral intuitions.
This Article adds to an emerging literature that suggests default rules are
not merely starting points for parties that may then bargain around the default. In
line with our findings, the empirical evidence suggests that individuals rarely
bargain around default rules. Regardless of the substantive outcome, a majority of
individuals stick with the default.19' Several theoretical explanations have been
position on the impossibility of measuring goods against one another given the plurality of
values).
188. See Kelman, supra note 180, at 694-95; Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 835-40 (1994). For some
economic speculation about the reasons for the discomfort, see Eric A. Posner, The
Strategic Basis ofPrincipled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1185, 1200-07 (1998); Farnsworth, supra note 168, at 397-98 (offering
incommensurability as a possible explanation for the observed lack of post judgment
bargaining in nuisance disputes).
189. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 160, at 73 (courts tend to do so).
190. See supra Part I.B.
191. The impact of defaults is documented for instance in the literature on the
impact of defaults on 401(k) participation savings rates, rollovers, and asset allocation. For
example, when employees are automatically enrolled in their 401(k) plan, only a tiny
fraction opt out; while, when employees are not automatically enrolled, less than half enroll.
See, e.g., James J. Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant
Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL'Y & EcoNOMY 67, 67-113 (James
M. Poterba, ed., 2002); James J. Choi et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and
401(k) Savings Behavior, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE EcoNoMics OF AGING 81, 83 (David
Wise, ed., 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10341.pdf; Brigitte C. Madrian
& Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings
Behavior, 116 Q. J. EcoN. 1149, 1184-86 (2001).
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offered to explain the so-called "stickiness" of default rules: drafting and other
transaction costs,192 path dependence due to learning and network effects, 193 the
fear that negative inferences will be made from proposals to deviate from the legal
default rule,194 a lack of agreement over alternatives, status quo preference,196
and the cognitive limitations of contracting parties.' 97 As we have demonstrated,
default remedies matter for another reason. When expressed as a legal default, the
legal right to demand performance creates a sense of entitlement. In some
instances, concern with infringement of the legal right might become more
important than the original, value-maximizing goals of the contract.
Our study sheds new light on the actual behavior and motivations of
contracting parties. The results provide insight into perception of contractual
obligations in various institutional settings. In doing so, our insights can help to
build more accurate models of contractual behavior and may prove helpful in the
design of legal rules and institutions that promote efficient contracting.
192. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 741 (1992) (pointing out contractual
inefficiencies due to the non-verifiable nature of hidden characteristics of the more
informed party).
193. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REv. 713, 729-34
(1997) (discussing network externalities and learning effects).
194. Parties might stick with the default because of fear that proposing an opt-out
from the default will dissuade his potential counterparty from entering into the agreement.
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 651, 652, 661 (2006) (claiming that the stickiness problem of defaults is
potentially broader and more prevalent than previously perceived); Lisa Bernstein, Social
Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 59, 70-73 (1993) (exploring
the possibility that contracting parties form adverse judgments when they receive proposals
to alter default norms); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic
Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 628-29 (1990) (for instance, the
limited liability default is stickier than an unlimited liability default because only with the
former does an opt-out reveal the shipper's high idiosyncratic value of performance);
Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. EcON. 432, 432-35
(1992) (presenting a formal model of the signaling effects of bargaining proposals involving
adverse inferences in negotiations).
195. Sloof, supra note 183.
196. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 608, 675 (1998).
197. See Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 3, 3-4, 13-15 (2006);
Richard R. W. Brooks et al., Contracts as Frames: Why Loss Frames Increases Effort, 168
J. INST. & TH. EcoN. 62, 81 (2012).
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